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Either Or is one of those rare ethical works which seem to speak concretely 
to our condition. Its appeal is quite different from the cooler and more 
rarefied attraction which moral philosophy normally exerts. To read Either Or 
is not only to see a brilliant mind at work on its ideas; it is also to sense 
a profound experience of life, and a vivid sensibility to life’s complexities. 
This may tempt us to identify Either Or as a »philosophical novel« or poem, 
rather than as a work of ethics.l And indeed Kierkegaard’s method, here 
and in other early works, has many resemblances to the novelist’s. To philos­
ophise in this manner is, in truth, an art. Nevertheless, it would be a mis­
take to treat Kierkegaard as no more than a novelist. For behind the direct 
and moving diagnosis of everyday human existence lies a detailed, rigorous, 
and general scheme of philosophical reasoning, which gives structure and 
meaning to the seemingly contingent analyses which fill the book.
Serious study of Either Or immediately reveals that work’s extraordinary 
resemblance to a central strand of Hegelian moral philosophy. This links 
Kierkegaard with other Hegelians; the reader who is familiar with the Brit­
ish tradition will naturally think of F. H. Bradley. The ethical position 
stated by Judge William in the second volume of Either Or can easily be 
described by the phrase »my station and its duties«. There is perhaps an 
inwardness to Judge William’s position which is missing from Bradley’s; 
but they are connected by their explicit relating of ethical themes to psycho­
logical and ontological themes. For both men, ethics is concerned as much 
with the nature of the moral self as with the principles and duties proper 
to this self. Their concern derives from their common master Hegel. For 
Hegel’s accounts of Moralitat and Sittlichkeit are analyses of the develop­
ment of the human subject as much as expositions of concrete ethical views. 
Richard Wollheim says that reading Bradley might show contemporary
philosophers that ethical problems are inseparable from psychological ones;2 
I would add that they are inseparable from metaphysical problems about 
persons.
This perhaps sounds like a technical issue; but it is more than that. To 
read Kierkegaard’s books, like Hegel’s and Bradley’s, as pure philosophy 
would be to miss half their point. Philosophizing for such men was more 
(but not less) than a detailed and rigorous explication of concepts. It was 
the reflection of central problems of their age. Their ethics was not just 
a generalized analysis of the principles of any possible moral point of view; 
it was a concrete, practical response to the quandaries of their societies. 
Being philosophers, such men did not often discuss the day-to-day evolution 
of Germany, Denmark, or Britain. They were more concerned with what 
they saw beneath the surface; the nature and tendency of their society and 
age, and the possibilities and difficulties so constituted for individuals in 
their everyday lives.
It is this diagnostic generalization which gives their ethics its relevance 
to our condition. For, though much has changed since they wrote, much 
that is deep and not immediately visible has not. In Hegel’s eyes, the crucial 
problem of modern Western society was how to restore some form of 
human »community«, the ancient forms of which had been dissolved by 
the powerful spirits of modernity. Individualism, rationalism, a fetishism 
of logic and experimental science, a drive towards total liberty and total 
equality: such ideals seemed to have made it impossible to live a communal 
and fraternal life. There existed, too, a philosophical justification for these 
ideals. Starting with Hobbes, and culminating in Kant, the theoretical ar­
guments had further contributed to the dissolution. Paradoxically, even those 
ethical writings which were aimed at guiding modern man could only deepen 
his confusion. For at the heart of modern ethics lay the very ideal which 
summed up man’s alienation from his fellows and himself: the ideal of the 
individual human will as creator of values and well-spring of duties. 3
Although this ideal is presented most strikingly in Kant’s writings, it 
is also plainly visible in subjectivist and romantic moralities. Both Hegel 
and Kierkegaard placed their accounts of Sittlichkeit in the context of an 
attack on all moralities of the creative individual will. It is this fundamental 
feature of their work which makes them relevant today. For, whatever has 
superficially changed, the dominance of that ideal has scarcely been ques­
tioned. It controls our ethical theorizing as much as our social and political 
practice; and it rules Oxford and Harvard as successfully as Paris and Hei­
delberg. If the nineteenth century philosophers returned to life, they would 
find much in our culture and its intellectual representatives that was pro­
foundly familiar.
I have so far taken Hegel and Kierkegaard together, as advocates of 
»community«. But they spoke for very different kinds of community; they 
spoke in very different senses of »community«. This is the point at which 
we must recall that Kierkegaard does not always write in propria persona. 
In Either Or, Judge William expounds a Hegelian community, although 
Kierkegaard himself never did so. Judge William’s ideal reflects the bour­
geois (bürgerlich) images of Northern Lutheranism; but Kierkegaard’s 
own ideals were churchly, and perhaps even mystical.
It cannot be too often said that Kierkegaard’s own opinions are not those 
expressed by Judge William; that Kierkegaard directly opposes Judge Wil­
liam in many crucial issues, of which one is the sense of the ideal of com­
munity. Judge William wants to create empirical community in place of 
modern society;4 Kierkegaard is quite uninterested in sociology. By »com­
munity« he, rather, intends the true Church, the mystical body of the faith­
ful, which cannot be identified with any earthly institution.
Kierkegaard’s vision is decisively profounder than Judge William’s, or 
Hegel’s, For Hegel can be accused of advocating a backward-looking and 
wholly negative ideal, namely the restoration in post-revolutionary Europe 
of forms of life drawn from idealizing Greek and mediaeval societies. This 
cannot be said of Kierkegaard, who is radical in a way impossible for a 
Hegelian; for his thought cuts so deep that the whole empirical concept of 
history becomes irrelevant, and only the existential problem of one’s relation, 
as this individual, with God remains. Over and over again, Kierkegaard 
repeats that true community cannot be founded by any external or collective 
action, but only through such individual relations with God. 5 »Community«, 
therefore, means the inward and spiritual resultant of isolated acts in which 
individuals detach themselves from the assumptions of the modern world.
Kierkegaard’s divergence from Judge William is now clear. It is integral 
to Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the spiritual condition of the modern world 
that it offers the only possible cure for itself. If »levelling« and »the crowd« 
are the neurosis of modern society, still they impose on us in visible form
a reduction of status which corresponds to our eternal essence. We become 
human, and equal.6 Now this result could not be achieved either by historical 
Catholicism or by established Protestantism. Paradoxically, it is the very 
process of secularisation which holds out the only hope for its own over­
coming.
Judge William’s opinions are likely to find a readier welcome in our 
time than Kierkegaard’s. For we have continued to advance towards the 
incorporation of moral and religious life within the socio-political; towards 
identifying morality and religion with public institutions. Even Judge 
William may appear too inward for contemporary taste; what passed a cen­
tury ago for a paradigm of bourgeois respectability may now appear over- 
intense, and exaggerated. Still, there is nothing new in the general prefer­
ence for Judge William over Kierkegaard. Far from escaping the latter’s 
notice, this preference constituted the major premiss of his indirect critique 
of modernity. For how can you communicate a message which contradicts 
everything the public believes, except by presenting it in forms which, 
though superficial and deceptive, the public can accept as relevant?
Towards the end of Either Or, a radical inconsistency becomes visible 
within Judge William’s concept of ethics. 7 A contradiction becomes visible 
between the social (secular) and Christian aspects of his vision. This con­
tradiction can be understood in two different ways; either Judge William 
is unsuccessfully trying to squeeze the spirit of a Christian morality into 
a Hegelian bottle, or he is unconvincingly expressing a Hegelian ethics in 
the language of Christianity. Whichever view the reader takes, he will 
naturally construe Judge William as a hypocrite, insofar as the latter adheres 
unconsciously to two incompatible ideals. Now Kierkegaard’s technique is 
designed partly to reveal Judge William as a hypocrite. For it is this judge­
ment which implies that Judge William’s conceptual scheme is inadequate. 
However, the reader is now faced by a choice between two possible infer­
ences. One leads him to follow Kierkegaard towards a re-sanctification of 
individual life; the other leads him to follow Hegel towards a re-secular­
ization of Sittlichkeit, by ignoring the Christian language and emphasizing 
marriage, friendship, »personal relations«, and the public context of 
morality. Either Or cannot itself determine either reading uniquely.
The Christian reading of Either Or presents no problems which I can 
discuss in this study. I shall therefore turn at once to the Hegelian reading.
It is a truism, but true, that the regeneration of community is a concern 
of the present time. To this concern the second volume of Either Or is pro­
foundly relevant. Its message that a truly moral life requires commitment 
to the concrete situations of every day is a welcome contrast to philosophies 
of isolation and absurdity. But it does not achieve this contrast by denying 
the truth in such philosophies; on the contrary, the justification of Sittlichkeit 
is grounded on the reality of despair. By this tactic, Kierkegaard not only 
serves the truth, but also grips his audience. His psychology of despair is, 
indeed, a large part of the reason for his contemporary popularity. The 
modern intellect is, as it has long been, at a pre-ethical stage of feeling and 
understanding; so that a diagnosis of the human condition as essentially 
despairing will naturally be received as accurate. Now Judge William argues 
that the despair which is grounded not in contingent events, but in the 
very structure of the psyche's relations with external objects, can be finally 
overcome. All that is needed is an act of commitment to a life essentially 
involving others. For Kierkegaard himself, of course, this claim is disastrously 
false. If despair can be overcome at all, it is not in this way. 8 Yet if we 
reject Kierkegaard’s vision, Judge William’s argument appears sound.9
More important, Judge William offers a concrete account of the life 
which involves others. He does not just point to »community«; he offers 
a precise judgement of its essential nature. In doing so, he enables us to 
re-integrate the past and the present. Here Judge William distinguishes 
himself from the tedious propagandists for the ways of our ancestors (et hoc 
genus omne) whose words are so loud and so ineffectual. For, unlike them, 
he explicitly derives his ideals from a philosophical concept of the human 
self. Hence the ideals of marriage, friendship, and work cease to float vainly 
in the air, and receive a firm foundation in metaphysics. Thus Kierkegaard 
may attract the attention of readers who are unmoved by mere conservatism. 
For he answers their tacit appeal for justification rather than mere reminis­
cence.
I said earlier that both Hegel and Kierkegaard advanced their accounts of 
Sittlichkeit as dialectical responses to the modern »existentialist« moralities. 
In Hegel, the dialectic emerges in the demonstration that the concepts which 
are used in expressing and justifying »existentialism« are incoherent until 
developed into forms which express and justify the ethics of Sittlichkeit. Of 
these concepts the central one is freedom; that is, choice. Kierkegaard partly
imitates Hegel. For Judge William shows »the young man« that the very 
concepts employed by the latter to explicate his aestheticism can be coherently 
grasped only when developed into the forms they take in Judge William’s 
moral vision. Either Or is, among other things, a Hegelian deduction of 
marriage, friendship, and vocation from choice.
I cannot here attempt to discuss the soundness of this project. The crucial 
point is that Kierkegaard believed that the modern moral outlook would 
collapse under philosophical pressure; and that such pressure would create, 
even if only as an intermediate result, an ethics of Sittlichkeit. (But I sug­
gested earlier that further pressure will destroy this position too). Is Kierke­
gaard right? I do not know; and even if I thought that I knew, I would 
hesitate before answering. For answering this question goes beyond solving 
an intellectual problem. It requires the reader to take a stand on his relation 
to the deepest beliefs and values of his world.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Louis Mackey’s Kierkegaard: A kind of Poet.
2. See his Introduction to Bradley’s Ethical Studies, Oxford, 1962.
3. See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good.
4. For the meaning of these two ideas, see Tönnies’ Community and Society.
5. See, for example, Works of Love.
6. See The Present Age.
7. This inconsistency is embodied in the concept of the extraordinarius.
8. The Sickness Unto Death shows what Kierkegaard thought.
9. Consider, for example, the related and similar arguments in the work of Carl Rogers.
